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Abstract 
Though there are numerous studies attempting to describe and analyse the internal dynamics of 
academic economics, the results of these studies are often contradictory. In order to assess the 
potential usefulness of certain theoretical tools to the sociology of economics, this study presents 
and analyses an in-depth interview study of behavioural economists at Swedish universities. The 
theoretical framework under assessment is derived from the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu and 
the styles of reasoning approach. Utilizing the concept of styles of scientific reasoning, field 
theory, capital theory, and the notion of scientific habitus to analyse the rise of behavioural 
economics into the mainstream of the economics discipline, this study concludes that the 
theoretical framework provides tools that are very useful in the analysis of social phenomena in 
academic economics. 
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 Introduction 1
In recent years, there have been numerous studies attempting to describe and analyse the internal 
dynamics of the economics discipline. Fascinated or frustrated with the rise of an almost 
exclusively empirical discipline centred around quantitative reasoning, statistics, and mathematical 
modelling, sociologists of science and economists alike have published numerous articles and 
books on the subject. One particular branch of these studies commonly discusses or criticises a 
perceived lack of theoretical pluralism within the discipline, often understood to be a division 
between what is broadly referred to as heterodox economics and neoclassical or mainstream 
economics. Though this branch of studies is united by its subject matter, it is by no means 
unanimous – the studies alternatively conclude that a scientific revolution within economics is 
desirable, undesirable, unlikely, or ongoing. Regardless of the disagreement between the 
arguments coming from this branch of study, there seems to exist, above all, a frustration towards 
economics within the other social science disciplines. This frustration points to the need for more 
studies that evaluate theoretical and methodological approaches that can help researchers to 
describe and analyse the nature of academic economics. 
One rather recent – and arguably successful – example of theoretical diversification within 
economics is the integration of psychological and social perspectives made possible through the 
advancement of behavioural economics into the mainstream of the discipline. Behavioural 
economics seems to have been able to advance past the accusation of heterodoxy, perhaps best 
exemplified by the awarding of the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Science to prominent 
behavioural economists such as Daniel Kahneman, Vernon L. Smith, and Richard H. Thaler. 
Arguing that the process by which behavioural economics has become an accepted part of 
mainstream economics offers relevant material for a study of the internal dynamics of the 
discipline, this thesis specifically attempts to evaluate the usefulness of Pierre Bourdieu’s social 
theory and the concept of styles of reasoning to the sociology of economics. 
Beginning with an account of my research questions as well as some literature concerning 
the economics discipline, this thesis presents and analyses a qualitative study of behavioural 
economists at Swedish universities. As the field of research concerning the economics discipline is 
so vast, the previous studies discussed here are those that connect most fittingly to my subject 
area. The thorough presentation of my theoretical framework and methodology connect to my 
analysis of behavioural economics as well as my evaluation of the usefulness of these approaches. 
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 Purpose and Research Questions 1.1
This thesis attempts to assign itself a particular place within the large field of the sociology of 
economics. The purpose of my study is, as mentioned, to evaluate how useful the social theory of 
Pierre Bourdieu and the styles of reasoning approach can be to the study of academic economics. 
As I evaluate this by way of an in-depth interview study of behavioural economists at Swedish 
universities, this thesis also seeks to complement the knowledge concerning how behavioural 
economics has become a part of the mainstream of the economics discipline. Though the scope of 
this thesis is quite limited, I make reference to several previous studies in order to connect my 
arguments to a larger context. The relevance of my findings to other settings is also discussed 
more thoroughly below. 
In order for me to realize the ambition of my study, this thesis relates to two broadly 
delineated research questions: 
1. How do behavioural economists at Swedish universities view the advancement of their 
subfield in the economics discipline? 
2. How can a theoretical approach informed by the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu and 
the concept of styles of reasoning add to the understanding of disciplinary dynamics in 
academic economics? 
Though the second research question perhaps relates the most to the aspirations of this thesis, the 
first question is the one that my interview study can most readily provide answers to. Findings 
pertaining to both of the questions are discussed under the different headings of my results and 
analysis section. In my concluding remarks, I offer specific answers to my research questions. 
 
 The Economics Discipline 1.2
Broadly speaking, economics is the science that studies how economies function, often with a 
focus on how economic agents behave and interact with each other (Blaug, 2017). The discipline 
is, however, more readily characterized by its analytical methods rather than by the subjects upon 
which these methods are applied (Siven, 2017). Although initially quite literary, the economics 
discipline has become increasingly reliant on mathematical and statistical methods in the post-
World War II era (Fourcade, Ollion & Algan, 2015; Siven, 2017). The mathematical methods used 
by contemporary economists are often aimed at producing models – simplified theoretical 
representations of real-world phenomena – that can be used to create verifiable hypotheses about 
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economic behaviour (Blaug, 2017; Colander, 2000). Economic models frequently build upon the 
assumption that economic agents are rational:  
The implication of the rationality is that the behaviour is consciously or unconsciously goal-
oriented. When economists describe the behaviour of a company, they assume that 
companies strive to maximize an objective function (e.g. profit). The exact assumptions that 
are made about the objective function depend on the rest of the assumptions (e.g. if the 
owners have a decisive influence or if the company's management team is relatively 
independent of the owners). The model is in the next step confronted with empirical facts. 
Theory and empirics interact since the theoretical analysis often does not supply definite 
conclusions. When this is the case, statistical inquiries can clarify which of the possible 
theoretical effects that are prevalent. (Siven, 2017, my translation.) 
The segment of economics that builds its models around an assumption of rationality is often 
referred to as neoclassical or simply the mainstream of the discipline (Bergh, 2017; Heise, 2014). 
There is a strong consensus within the economics discipline about the theories and methods of its 
mainstream, which has led to increasingly standardized international textbooks and PhD 
programmes, as well as a strong emphasis on the importance of being published in the top 
economics journals (Hylmö, 2017). The consensus within economics has led the discipline to have 
a far more unitary disciplinary core than the other social sciences (Fourcade, Ollion & Algan, 
2015). 
Other than the development towards mathematical and statistical methods, the focus on 
rationality-assumption models, and the rise of a strong disciplinary core, the economics discipline 
has been going through what can be referred to as an ”empirical revolution” since the 1990’s 
(Fourcade, Ollion & Algan, 2015, p. 92). In an article attempting to analyse the publishing trends 
in some of the top economics journals during the 1963–2011 timespan, Daniel S. Hamermesh 
(2013) finds that the publication of purely theoretical papers has steadily declined, making way for 
empirical studies analysing original data as well as studies examining data from laboratory or field 
experiments (see Table 1). While the upsurge of experimental papers in economics journals 
largely correlates with the rise of behavioural economics described further below, the other 
developments within economics provide contextualization for the increasing divide between the 
mainstream and the non-mainstream of the discipline. 
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Table 1. From “Six Decades of Top Economics Publishing: Who and How?” by D. S. Hamermesh, 2013, 
Journal of Economic Literature, p. 168. Copyright 2013 American Economic Association. 
 
1.2.1 The Mainstream–Heterodox Divide 
The strong turn towards a unified economics discipline has been met with criticism, primarily 
from economists who connect to economic traditions that are not theoretically or methodologically 
compatible with neoclassical or mainstream economics (Dobusch and Kapeller, 2012; Heise, 
2014; Hylmö, 2017). These non-mainstream economists are often considered to belong to a group 
within the economics discipline referred to as heterodox, generally defined as the economic 
traditions that reject some or all of the principles of mainstream economics (Heise, 2014). The 
disagreement between the strong mainstream of the economics discipline and its heterodoxy can 
then be generally referred to as the mainstream–heterodox divide (Hylmö, 2017). Though the 
abundance of articles and books discussing different aspects of the mainstream–heterodoxy divide 
makes a comprehensive overview of the debate impossible within the scope of this thesis, a few 
prior studies that connect to the subject under study bare mentioning here. 
Arne Heise (2014) argues that the criticism towards the economics discipline has become 
more prominent since the 2008 financial crisis, further contending that the dualistic division 
between mainstream and heterodox economics risks obscuring the competing perspectives within 
the discipline and instead categorizes several of the disciplinary subfields within economics by 
their respective epistemology, methodology and heuristics (see Table 2). Heise bases his 
categorization of schools of economic thought on their adherence to, or rejection of, what he 
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Table 2. From “The Future of Economics in a Lakatos–Bourdieu Framework” by A. Heise, 2014, 
International Journal of Political Economy, p. 82. Copyright 2015 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. 
 
considers to be the main aspect of mainstream economics: the creation of rationality-assumption 
models known as dynamic-stochastic general equilibrium models (DSGEs). His categorization of 
economic subfields is of particular relevance to my study since behavioural economics is 
classified as a dissenting, rather than outright heterodox, theoretical school. 
Marion Fourcade, Etienne Ollion and Yann Algan (2015) contend that the economics 
discipline possesses a dominant position within the social sciences in the USA and attempt to 
analyse the nature of this dominance. One of their main arguments is that economics, to a larger 
degree than the other social sciences, is characterized by what they label insularity, a phenomenon 
that they demonstrate with bibliometric data. Using this data to show the tendency of US 
economists to chiefly cite texts from within their own discipline, the authors argue that: 
[t]here are several reasons for the insularity of economics, most importantly the different 
epistemological cultures of the various social science disciplines and the power inequalities 
between them. First, the theory of action that comes with economists’ analytical style is 
hardly compatible with the basic premise of much of the human sciences, namely that social 
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processes shape individual preferences (rather than the other way around). In economics, by 
contrast, “de gustibus non est disputandum” (Stigler and Becker 1977): preferences are 
“usually assumed to be fixed” (Baron and Hannan 1994, p. 1116). Second, the qualitative 
methods that underpin the work of many interpretive social scientists often do not square 
well with economists’ formal aspirations, with their views on causality, or with their 
predilection for methodological and theoretical precision over real-world accuracy. Third, 
even when the substantive terrains overlap, the explicit or implicit pecking order between the 
disciplines often stands in the way of a desirable form of intellectual engagement. 
(Fourcade, Ollion & Algan, 2015, p. 93.) 
The authors also contend that though economists often venture into potentially interdisciplinary 
fields of study “they are unlikely to learn much from [other scientists], as they often prefer to 
deploy their own techniques”  (Fourcade, Ollion & Algan, 2015, p. 94). Citing the responses of 
US professors from different disciplines in an opinion survey (see Table 3), they suggest that the 
insularity of economics is caused by an intellectual self-confidence that economists possess due to 
the dominant position of their science. 
 
 
Table 3. From “The Superiority of Economists” by M. Fourcade, E. Ollion, and Y. Algan, 2015, Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, p. 95. Copyright 2015 American Economic Association. 
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Anders Hylmö (2017) has conducted an interview study that is in some ways similar to my 
own. Between 2015 and 2016, Hylmö conducted in-depth interviews with 20 representatives of 
both mainstream and heterodox economics in Sweden. The aim of the study was largely to provide 
further insights into how the mainstream–heterodox divide is understood by economists 
themselves, and one of Hylmö’s (2017, p. 4) central claims is that a styles of reasoning approach 
can provide analysts with a theoretical framework that casts additional light on the subject of how 
disciplinary dynamics function and “help us understand important aspects of the intellectual 
divides in economics”. For instance, Hylmö (2017, p. 20) argues that “heterodox impulses” 
originate in exposure to different styles of reasoning. He furthermore argues that findings from 
within Swedish economics are “probably relevant” for other settings due to the US-oriented 
internationalization of the discipline (Hylmö, 2017, p. 3).  
 
1.2.2 The Rise of Behavioural Economics 
In the midst of the criticism towards the excluding nature of mainstream economics, one subfield 
has managed to gain ground within the discipline: behavioural economics. Where neoclassical 
modelling is often built upon an assumption of rationality in agents, researchers within 
behavioural economics attempt to account for the impact of psychological and social effects on 
economic behaviour when they create models (Bergh, 2017). Though research in behavioural 
economics has been going on since at least the 1950’s, it is largely since the 1980’s and during the 
1990’s that the field has gained recognition as a prominent subfield within the economics 
discipline (Geiger, 2017; Heukelom, 2014; Weber & Dawes, 2005). Though there is disagreement 
as to whether behavioural economics is to be considered a part of the mainstream or not, Leonhard 
Dobusch and Jakob Kapeller (2012, p. 1036) provide what they call “a stylized overview of the 
current economic discourse in the form of a simplified paradigmatic map” (see Figure 1). This 
paradigmatic map categorizes behavioural economics in much the same way as Heise (2014, see 
Table 2) and offers a helpful visualization of the subfield’s position within economics. The 
position on the map called “Colander’s Edge” is a reference to a categorization made by David 
Colander (2005, p. 192), who contends that “while [behavioural economics] is not center 
mainstream, it is clearly at the edge of mainstream”. 
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Figure 1. Map of paradigms in economic discourse from “Heterodox United vs. Mainstream City? 
Sketching a Framework for Interested Pluralism in Economics” by L. Dobusch and J. Kapeller, 2012, 
Journal of Economic Issues, p. 1037. Copyright 2012 Journal of Economic Issues and the Association for 
Evolutionary Economics. 
 
With the historical development and the current position of behavioural economics in mind, 
what is of interest in this thesis is how the subfield has managed to gain such recognition within 
the economics discipline while other perspectives are still labelled heterodox (see Table 2 and 
Figure 1). Roberto Weber and Robyn Dawes (2005) provide a general outline of the process that 
research in behavioural economics goes through in order to become accepted by neoclassical 
economists, defining three general stages:  
(1) the demonstration of a behavioral result anomalous with traditional economic theory, (2) 
the replication, collection, and synthesis of a behavioral regularity, and (3) the development 
of behavioral theory incorporating the regularity. (Weber & Dawes, 2005, p. 91.) 
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It can be argued that the first two of these three stages are largely dependent on the way 
behavioural economists have made use of the experimental method, since it is generally through 
laboratory experiments that both theoretical anomalies and behavioural regularities have been 
demonstrated (Syll, 2011; Weber & Dawes, 2005). Lars Pålsson Syll (2011, p. 148, my 
translation) has previously reasoned that since early behavioural economics was “more about 
incorporating psychology in economic theory rather than developing an entirely new theory” it 
was not perceived as threatening by mainstream economists, meaning that the subfield was “able 
to more easily gain acceptance”. 
Economic experiments are largely similar to the laboratory experiments used by 
psychologists and other social scientists: subjects are brought into a lab or an artificial 
environment where their actions can be thoroughly recorded, and they are presented with, for 
example, tasks to be completed, problems to be solved, or decisions to be made (Heukelom, 2014; 
Weber & Dawes, 2005). The experimental method is commonly used by researchers to test 
behavioural assumptions and explore the potential sources or causes of specific behaviours, yet 
behavioural economists have distinguished their use of the method through their intentional focus 
on “experiments that are likely to be convincing to traditional economists skeptical of 
experimental research” (Weber & Dawes, 2005, p. 92). 
 
 Theoretical framework 2
In this section, I present the theoretical approaches that I will attempt to utilize and evaluate in the 
course of my analysis of the advancement of behavioural economics in the economics discipline. 
The approaches are the social theory of Pierre Bourdieu and the concept of styles of reasoning. 
Bourdieu referred to his theory as a theory of practice, where practice denotes the dynamic and 
dialectical process by which social agents interact with the social structures that shape their 
experiences. The styles of reasoning approach allows for the conceptualization of different 
scientific epistemologies and methodologies as differences in scientific styles. These two 
frameworks are used more or less interchangeably in my analysis. 
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 The Social Theory of Pierre Bourdieu 2.1
One of the aspects that sets Bourdieu’s sociology apart from much other sociological production is 
the way in which it strives to challenge certain categories and boundaries in social science. For 
example, Bourdieu (1990, p. 25) expressed a need to transcend the divide between subjectivism 
and objectivism “while preserving the gains from each of them”. This need to consolidate insights 
gained from separate and sometimes opposing perspectives also permeates much of Bourdieu’s 
theory, which is largely indebted to the classical social theories of Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim 
and Max Weber – meaning that Bourdieu essentially builds his theory from what is commonly 
viewed as separate sociological paradigms (Brubaker, 1985). Other than working to transcend 
established thoughts about the nature of truth and combining material from different schools of 
thought, Bourdieu sought to give his theories a thoroughly empirical ground to stand on by 
collecting data with the help of a wide variety of methodologies (Brubaker, 1985; Townley, 2014). 
The result of his theorizing and his empirical research are what he preferred to refer to as “a set of 
thinking tools” (Wacquant, 1989, p. 50). Several of these thinking tools are utilized in my analysis 
and therefore require some introduction. 
 
2.1.1 Field Theory 
Bourdieu conceptualizes the spaces in which social practice take place as fields, which, in the 
context of the large social cosmos of a differentiated society, are defined as “relatively 
autonomous social microcosms” that are governed by their own internal rules and hierarchies 
(Wacquant, 1989, p. 39). A field can be further defined as a relational network that consists of the 
social positions of individual agents – a network which is internally structured by the relationships 
of power between agents that are continually struggling with each other in pursuit of the social 
gains that can be attained within that specific field (Bourdieu, 1984; Griller, 1996; Wacquant, 
1989). When discussing different fields, it is possible to be either very general or very precise in 
scope – since all fields have subfields, a specific field may be conceptualized on several levels: “a 
broad field (e.g. education); a specific field (e.g. a discipline); or the social agents within a field 
(e.g. a department of a school)” (Townley, 2014, p. 42). 
In addition to the general concept of fields, Bourdieu’s theory offers some terminology that 
can be used to discuss the inner processes of these social spaces. For example, Bourdieu (1990, p. 
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66) calls the “presuppositions” of a field – its internal rules and logic – the doxa of that particular 
field. Agents wishing to be seen as legitimate members of a field must accept the doxa, as they 
otherwise run the risk of being called inexperienced or unqualified by other members of the field 
(Heidegren & Lundberg, 2010). The tendency by social agents to fully accept the doxa and to 
further internalize a “fundamental belief in the value of the stakes” of a field is referred to as 
illusio (Bourdieu, 2005, p. 9). Together, the doxa of the field and the illusio of the agents create 
boundaries of what is considered to be appropriate, possible, and true within a field – boundaries 
which, in extension, create the limits that distinguishes one field from another (Heidegren & 
Lundberg, 2010; Wacquant, 1989). 
Where doxa denotes the fundamental beliefs within a field, the term nomos refers to the 
specific value-systems or perspectives that are inherent to different fields (Bourdieu, 1990; 
Wacquant, 1989). For instance, Bourdieu (2005) argues that the nomos specific to the field of 
business can be understood by recognizing the way in which it principally values the pursuit of 
economic gain over social and familial obligations. It is consequently possible to talk about the 
nomos of different scientific disciplines:  
Every scientific discipline is also defined by a particular nomos. Nomos refers to the specific 
way a subject or discipline constructs its object, that is, how it views and delimits the subject 
from other disciplines. If doxa consists of a series of beliefs, nomos is rather a particular 
perspective. Nomos functions as a criterion of relevance that excludes certain approaches as 
irrelevant or illegitimate. (Heidegren & Lundberg, 2010, p. 13.) 
In short, then, one of the aims of this thesis is to analyse and describe the doxa, illusio, and nomos 
of the field of academic economics and the subfield of behavioural economics. 
 
2.1.2 Capital Theory 
Bourdieu refers to the social gains pursued by agents in fields as different forms of capital, of 
which economic, cultural, social, and symbolic are the main varieties (Bourdieu 2011; Townley, 
2014). Economic capital consists of money or assets that are easily transformed into money, such 
as property rights and other tangible business assets (Pret, Shaw & Dodd, 2016; Townley, 2014). 
This largely material form of capital is perhaps the most easily understood form of resource, as it 
is the form of capital that is generally “recognized by economic theory” (Bourdieu, 2011, p. 78). 
Cultural capital and social capital, however, should not be confused with the concept from 
economic theory referred to as human capital – a concept that Bourdieu (2005, p. 2) considered 
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“vague and flabby” as well as “heavily laden with sociologically unacceptable assumptions”. 
Rather, cultural capital consists of different constellations of “personal dispositions, cultural 
goods, skills and education”, while social capital has to do with “membership in societies, 
relations, networks and alliances” (Pret, Shaw & Dodd, 2016, p. 1007). Symbolic capital is a 
slightly different form of capital, as the other capitals are all capable of functioning as symbolic 
resources within a field (Townley, 2014). In short, economic, cultural, and social capital become 
symbolic capital when they are recognized by other agents within a field to be “legitimate and 
credible” (Lee & Shaw, 2016, p. 1737), such as when they take on the form of “awards, trophies, 
diplomas, publicity, reputation and prestige” (Pret, Shaw & Dodd, 2016, p. 1007). Though 
economic, cultural, social, and symbolic capital together make up the fundamentals of Bourdieu’s 
capital theory, there are occasionally references to other, more specific, forms of capital, such as 
when Bourdieu (2005, p. 194) states that “technological capital, juridical capital and 
organizational capital” can constitute assets in the field of business. 
 
2.1.3 Habitus 
Another central thinking tool in Bourdieusian social theory is the notion of habitus, an internalized 
and embodied system of social structures that guides the perceptions, dispositions, and behaviour 
of individual agents (Bourdieu, 1984). Habitus is the product of both collective and individual 
history and provides agents with schemes of everything from appreciation to action, leading 
Bourdieu (2005, p. 211) to describe it as a form of “socialized subjectivity”. The notion that what 
guides individual agency is not purely the result of personal experiences, but rather the product of 
an individual’s historical positions in specific social spaces, separates the notion of habitus from 
more specifically psychological postulations (Griller, 1996). Though habitus acts as “the 
organizing principle” of individual agency and informs “all thought and action” (Bourdieu, 1977, 
p. 17), the concept is in no way meant be deterministic, nor is it meant to imply that agents 
consciously follow a specific set of rules – rather, habitus should be understood as an acquired and 
largely unconscious system of dispositions that has its basis in social structures and therefore 
guides practical activity in social fields (Brubaker, 1985). Since the activity in fields is largely 
governed by the habitus of individual agents, habitus and field can be said to interact in producing 
the strategies that agents unconsciously follow in pursuit of field-specific capital (Griller, 1996). 
The separation between the primary habitus and a specific habitus should also be made clear: 
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while the primary habitus is largely formed during early socialization, a specific habitus can be 
formed much later as the result of activity within a particular field (Townley, 2014). 
 
2.1.4 Sociology of Science 
Though Bourdieu is perhaps generally not thought of as a sociologist of science, he did utilize and 
adapt his thinking tools to research and discuss the nature of scientific production (e.g. Bourdieu, 
1975, 1991, 2004). In Homo Academicus (1988), Bourdieu even examined, in detail, the social 
backgrounds and current behaviour of many of his contemporary scientists in an attempt to map 
the struggles for power and capital within the French intellectual field, demonstrating that science 
is not merely characterized by the production of knowledge. Though such an extensive study of 
the economics discipline would no doubt be interesting, it is beyond both the focus and scope of 
this thesis. What is of interest here is rather the way in which Bourdieu operationalized his 
concepts in his sociology of science. 
One specific habitus that Bourdieu (1975, p. 30) mentions is “the scientific habitus”, 
meaning the habitus a social agent acquires during the course of an advanced academic education. 
This habitus provides schemes of perception and appreciation specific to the scientific field, 
meaning, in short, that this specific habitus becomes their “embodied sense of judgement in 
scientific matters” (Hylmö, p. 11). 
In addition to the scientific habitus, Bourdieu (1975) sees the concept of scientific authority 
as a particular form of social capital. In discussing the ability of actors in the field of 
scientific production to acquire this social capital, he contends that: 
a particular producer cannot expect recognition of the value of his products (“reputation”, 
“prestige”, “authority”, “competence”, etc.) from anyone except other producers, who, being 
his competitors too, are those least inclined to grant recognition without discussion and 
scrutiny. This is true de facto: only scientists involved in the area have the means of 
symbolically appropriating his work and assessing its merits. And it is also true de jure; the 
scientist who appeals to an authority outside the field cannot fail to incur discredit. 
(Bourdieu, 1975, p. 23) 
Bourdieu therefore argues that only scientists who share a discipline can bestow scientific 
authority upon each other’s work – in other words: only other actors in a certain scientific field 
that are endowed with the specific habitus of that field can grant the capital specific to that field. 
Bourdieu (1975, p. 30) further argues that scientific journals serve the function of “holding out the 
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example of what deserves the name of science”, meaning that they can be said to “exercise a de 
facto censorship of heretical productions”. 
 
 The Styles of Reasoning Approach 2.2
In addition to utilizing Bourdieu’s social theory and its terminology, I will, in discussing the 
results of my interview study, make use of what can be referred to as the styles of reasoning 
approach. Though initially labelled differing Denkstile or styles of thinking by theorists such as 
Karl Mannheim, Ludwik Fleck and Alistair Crombie (cf. Crombie, 1995; Fleck, 1979; Nelson, 
1992), Ian Hacking (1992, 2012) has suggested a shift of focus to styles of reasoning when 
discussing scientific disciplines in order to incorporate the more social and practical aspects of 
scientific production. Mary S. Morgan (2012, p. 15) has previously utilized this concept of styles 
of reasoning in her study of the rise of mathematical modelling in economics, where she contends 
that different styles are simply different “ways of finding out about the world”. 
In short, the styles of reasoning approach conceptualizes differences in the epistemological 
assumptions, or preferred methodologies, of scientific disciplines as variances of style. Hylmö 
(2017), as previously mentioned, has argued that the concept of scientific styles makes it possible 
to understand the mainstream–heterodox divide in economics as a dispute over the legitimacy of 
differing styles. I would therefore argue that the styles framework should act to simplify the 
analysis of scientific reasoning, as it consolidates rather complex notions such as theory, 
epistemology, and methodology into the more easily accessible notion of styles. 
Though the framework may simplify the discussion and analysis of the reasoning specific to 
different scientific disciplines, the concept of scientific styles can also be argued to have 
comprehensive implications for the understanding of scientific production: 
Each style has become what we think of as a rather timeless canon of objectivity, a standard 
or model of what it is to be reasonable about this or that type of subject matter. We do not 
check to see whether mathematical proof or laboratory investigation or statistical ‘studies’ 
are the right way to reason: they have become (after fierce struggles) what it is to reason 
rightly, to be reasonable in this or that domain. (Hacking, 1992, p. 10.) 
The notion that the accepted styles of reasoning in different scientific disciplines are the result of 
struggles connects to Bourdieu’s (1988) study of power struggles in the French intellectual field. 
As a style of reasoning defines what is considered reasonable or true within a scientific discipline, 
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the approach also shares some characteristics with certain Bourdieusian notions – notably doxa, 
illusio, nomos, and habitus. 
 
  Methodology 3
In addition to introducing relevant previous studies and presenting the theoretical perspectives 
employed in my analysis, I will review the methods of data collection and processing that this 
thesis has utilized. As previously mentioned, the study presented here gained its empirical 
substance through a series of in-depth interviews at the economics departments at Swedish 
universities – specifically Lund University and the Stockholm School of Economics. Though the 
questions in my interview guide (see Appendix) are structured according to particular themes, the 
questions were specifically written to allow unstructured and open-ended answers; meaning that 
my guide was designed to facilitate what is commonly referred to as “semi-structured interviews” 
(Trost, 2010, p. 42, my translation). I conducted three interviews at each institution, totalling six 
interviews with three professors and three PhD students. Though all of the interview subjects were 
at the time of the interview study focused on behavioural economics research, all of them did not 
identify solely as behavioural economists – this term is, however, utilized when referring to them 
for the sake of simplicity. My choice to conduct interviews at Lund University and the Stockholm 
School of Economics was founded on the fact that, according to the Web of Science, these two 
institutions together with Stockholm University are the top three Swedish contributors to 
economics journals. Since the economics departments at Lund University and the Stockholm 
School of Economics also tend to describe themselves as “distinguished” and “leading”, making 
reference to international rankings of university faculties and departments (see, e.g., Lund 
University, 2015, 2016; Stockholm School of Economics, 2017), I would argue that these 
departments are well-suited for a study of mainstream economics. Though I had initially intended 
to interview behavioural economists at all three of the prolific institutions, I was unable to find 
willing participants at Stockholm University. Had my study included informants at Stockholm 
University, or had my study been conducted at completely different economics departments, the 
findings may have been different. As the economics discipline is quite internationally unitary, 
however, I believe that the results would have been analogous. I also believe, in line with Hylmö 
(2017), that results from studies in Sweden are likely to be relevant in other similar settings. 
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As several of my informants were international researchers not fluent in Swedish, all of my 
informants were asked if they were comfortable with conducting their interviews in English. None 
of them expressed any anxiety towards this, so all of my interviews were conducted in the 
language of this thesis. All of my informants agreed to have their interviews recorded, and a gap 
of three weeks between the interviews in Lund and those in Stockholm allowed me to transcribe 
the first three interviews and update my interview guide into its final form (see Appendix). My 
interviews were between 40 minutes to an hour long. When I had carried out and transcribed all of 
my interviews, they were thoroughly re-read in order for me to be able to structure my findings 
and present informative excerpts in the results and analysis section of this thesis. Since the society 
of researchers at Swedish universities interested in behavioural economics is quite small, some of 
my informants expressed a desire to be as anonymous as possible. Because of this, I have chosen 
to not gender the quoted responses from my interviewees, as well as to leave out passages where 
they describe themselves or their research very explicitly. 
Qualitative in-depth interviews are a relevant method of gathering data for this study for 
several reasons. The main reason lies in the formulation of my principal research question, where I 
make it clear that it is the views of behavioural economists that I am interested in. Where 
quantitative studies are fit for mapping different volumes and frequencies, data gathered through 
qualitative studies can be used to analyse and understand the ways humans interpret and organize 
their social surroundings (Trost, 2010). In line with Pierre Bourdieu (1975, 1991, 2004), this thesis 
views the production of scientific knowledge as a largely social phenomenon and consequently 
focuses on social explanations of this phenomenon. Since my intention is to mainly study the 
social aspects of scientific production, I would argue that qualitative interviews offer me more 
relevant empirical data to build my analysis from – a quantitative approach would presumably not 
have given me as clear insights into the perceptions and attitudes of behavioural economists. 
In re-reading and structuring my qualitative data, I have attempted to follow the 
methodological recommendations presented by Jens Rennstam and David Wästerfors (2015). 
When discussing the processing of qualitative data, Rennstam and Wästerfors (2015) argue that 
the presentation of qualitative data can be done through categorical and illustrative reduction. 
Categorical reduction refers to the active choice of presenting and discussing specific parts of the 
sorted qualitative data, meaning “a reduction of the material that (more or less) excludes some 
parts of it” (Rennstam & Wästerfors, 2015, p. 105, my translation). Having done this initial 
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reduction, the analyst can do an illustrative reduction of the data, which means looking for 
excerpts that emphasize certain aspects of the data in order to “illustrate a phenomenon as clearly 
as possible” (Rennstam & Wästerfors, 2015, p. 112, my translation). The categorical and 
illustrative reductions I have made in the processing of my data have largely been made in relation 
to the findings of the previous studies and the theoretical framework I have presented above. 
Presenting findings that can be compared with those of previous studies enables me to put my 
relatively small study in relation to the larger context of research concerning the economics 
discipline, while connecting my theoretical framework to specific parts of my data allows me to 
answer my research question regarding the usefulness of these perspectives.  
As an assessment of my theoretical framework is central to the purpose of this thesis, it is 
important to further discuss the relationship between my theory and my methodology. Though my 
methods are not inspired by Bourdieu’s approach to qualitative interviews (see Hamel, 1998), 
much of the work done in preparation of my interview study was informed by his social theory as 
well as the styles of reasoning approach. Bourdieu himself utilized his thinking tools to theorize as 
well as to conduct empirical research, meaning that his social theory can be considered a meta-
theory intended to assist with research design as well as to prompt the creation of relevant research 
questions (Hurtado, 2010). Similarly to this understanding of Bourdieu, I would argue that the 
styles of reasoning approach primarily offers ways of describing the subject matter of this thesis, 
rather than it being a theory to be validated. As such, my theoretical framework has informed the 
creation of my research questions and my interview guide, meaning that this study does not 
conform to, for instance, Howard S. Becker’s (1998, p. 123) principle that the analyst should “let 
the case define the concept”. Since Becker (1998) argues that deciding upon a theory before 
conducting research increases the risk of leaving out the data that cannot be understood through 
that particular perspective, I have actively looked for potential clashes between my data and my 
theoretical framework in order to decrease the risk of my study excluding theory-incompatible 
data. This search for clashes is furthermore in line with my purpose to evaluate the usefulness of 
the theoretical framework utilized in this thesis. 
 
 Results and Analysis 4
In this section, I present and analyse some findings from my interviews by discussing quotations 
and excerpts with the help of my theoretical framework. The section is broadly structured into 
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three subsections that all have a connection to my purpose and my research questions. Outlining 
first the relationships between behavioural economics and the accepted styles of reasoning in 
mainstream academic economics, I move on to discuss the scientific habitus of behavioural 
economists, as well as deliberate on some insights gained from their attitudes towards 
interdisciplinary research. 
 
 The Styles of Reasoning in Academic Economics 4.1
When asked about the specificity of the economics discipline, my informants were unanimous: 
academic economics is defined by its focus on quantitative methods and the creation of models. 
Speaking with reverence about mathematical modelling, my informants have variously spoken 
about how “math simplifies your thought”, how “models allow you to see unexpected 
connections”, and how qualitative data is “not taken into account” in economics. The behavioural 
economists I have spoken to have all also made reference to the unitary nature of their disciplinary 
field, generally discussed by way of its standardized textbooks and its mainstream’s belief in the 
importance of “the top journals”. The self-understanding of behavioural economists regarding 
their position within the economics discipline seems to be in line with the paradigmatic 
classifications I have previously presented (see Table 2 and Figure 1), as they generally describe 
themselves in relation to – rather than in contrast with – mainstream and neoclassical economists. 
My informants did not express any particular interest in the mainstream–heterodox divide, nor did 
they articulate any agreement with, for example, Heise’s (2014) notion that the criticism towards 
academic economics has increased since the 2008 financial crisis. However, by and large, the 
responses from the behavioural economists I have spoken to can be said to confirm the picture of 
mainstream economics outlined in the definitions and previous studies presented above. 
Drawing from Bourdieu, it is possible to view the economics discipline as a specific field, 
where mainstream economics can be seen as the field’s dominant core and behavioural economics 
can be understood as a subfield mostly positioned within this core – Dobusch and Kapeller’s 
(2012) stylized map (Figure 1) lends itself rather well to a visualization of this understanding of 
the field of academic economics. Based on a comparison between the qualitative data I have 
gathered and the existing literature I have presented, it is further possible to assert that the agents 
in the behavioural economics subfield appear to share the illusio of the mainstream economics 
core, as all agents seem to adhere to a similar doxa and nomos. In the case of academic economics, 
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doxa and nomos even appear to be highly interrelated, since, for instance, economists’ belief in the 
superiority of quantitative studies exemplify both the internal presuppositions and the criterions of 
relevance within their field. 
An example of when the behavioural economists in my study have given a rather direct 
insight into the illusio of agents in the field of economics can be found in their tendency to bring 
up the centrality of causality to their discipline. All of my interview subjects have indicated that 
the search for significant correlations is central to any economics study wishing to be published in 
a good journal. Several of my informants have – entirely independently of each other – referred to 
this search for causal links as an “obsession”. One professor furthermore suggested that the 
importance of causality in economics is one of the contributing reasons for the increase in 
laboratory experiments (see Table 1) the discipline has seen in recent years: 
I [informant]: I think the underlying aspect is that we are hunting for causalities. Any kind of 
method that tries to be better – or pretends to be better – at doing that is enjoying, at first, a 
relatively broad acceptance. Behavioural economics has a little bit the appeal, I believe, that 
it makes social scientists feel like they are doing as serious work as people in natural science. 
When asked about the difference between experiments and other forms of quantitative data, 
another professor stated that the answer was “of course causality”, going on to praise economic 
experiments for the way in which they allow researchers to “change just one variable” and 
consequently “make much more firm inferences about whether this variable mattered for the 
behaviour”. 
It seems that in order to become a mainstream style of reasoning in the field of academic 
economics, the style in question must be quantitative and allow for the generation of causal 
inferences. The rather reflexive analogy between behavioural economics and the natural sciences 
in the excerpt above arguably offers some nuance to Fourcade, Ollion, and Algan’s (2015, p. 93) 
assertion that qualitative methodologies “do not square well with economists’ formal aspirations”, 
since the analogy additionally indicates that the approaches acceptable to mainstream economics 
have as much to do with economists’ self-image as they have to do with scientifically motivated 
rigour. Speaking specifically about the process by which the behavioural and experimental style 
gained a central position in the economics discipline, one professor focused on the strategies 
employed in the 1980’s and 1990’s by early behavioural and experimental economist, and later 
Nobel laureate, Richard H. Thaler. Focusing specifically on the ways in which Thaler attempted to 
integrate psychological insights into economics, this professor reasoned like this: 
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I: So I’m reading Thaler’s book Misbehaving now, and he was getting so much pushback for 
his ideas – it’s ridiculous, how he had to defend his ideas! [- - -] When you’re reading 
Thaler’s book, he’s trying to explain some phenomena and people are really trying to come 
up with, like, traditional explanations to his observations – and they make no sense! That’s 
not very scientific. I found that hilarious. But I guess, I mean someone like Thaler, he 
managed to show so systematically how there were biases, and how people are boundedly 
rational, have social preferences, self-control problems… He managed to show it so 
systematically that people had to update, basically. So, he could show it for individual 
decision-making, more aggregate outcomes like market outcomes, with different types of 
models… The fact that he used such a big toolbox, I think helped behavioural economics 
quite a lot. 
Other than the fact that this understanding of rise of behavioural economics is similar to the 
history and framework put forward by Weber and Dawes (2005), it also exemplifies a specific 
case of a style-related struggle in the field of academic economics. Though behavioural economics 
differs from neoclassical economics in its theoretical assumptions, the centrality of causal 
inference to mainstream economics allowed for the integration of the experimental style, which in 
turn allowed behavioural economists to demonstrate the validity of their theories. 
The previous literature and my theoretical framework have both helped me contextualize my 
analysis of the mainstream styles of reasoning in academic economics. An interesting aspect of my 
data is the fact that behavioural economists exhibit a rather full understanding of their position 
within the field of academic economics, as well as the way in which their subfield has gained this 
position. Since quantitative processing and causal inference are so central to the pursuit of 
scientific authority – i.e. social capital – in academic economics, it is perhaps possible to speak of 
causality capital as a form of social gain specific to the field. Viewed like this, I would say that it 
is further possible to speak of the rise of behavioural economics as an example of the strategic 
leveraging of field-specific capital in pursuit of a more central and dominant position within a 
field. The fact that economics journals are perceived to primarily publish articles concerning 
studies that present statistically significant correlations is a clear example of what is held up as 
good science in economics, demonstrating what Bourdieu (1975, p. 30) called the “censorship of 
heretical productions” that journals can exercise in a disciplinary field. 
 
 21 
 
 
 The Scientific Habitus of Behavioural Economists 4.2
In the course of my interviews, I found that most of my informants had either received formal 
training in disciplines other than economics during their undergraduate studies, or they had 
initially considered applying to educational programmes in other disciplines. Interestingly, very 
few of them had taken undergraduate courses in psychology – rather, most of them had taken 
elective courses in mathematics and philosophy as a part of their bachelor and master degrees. 
Discussing the impact of undergraduate studies on later choices regarding what doctoral 
programme to apply for and which courses to do within it, one PhD student reasoned like this:  
I: I think my reasoning was to find a subject that combined philosophy and mathematics. 
Economics is a bit mathematical, but also more philosophical than mathematics. 
WH: And what brought you to behavioural economics, specifically? 
I: Actually my first thought was to do something more mathematical within economics, so 
maybe some kind of macrofinance or econometrics stuff. But when I began doing PhD-
courses I found the behavioural approach appealing. [- - -] It was more philosophical, you 
know, how it goes deeper into the human part of economics than maybe other parts of 
economics does. So, apparently I’m more of a philosopher than a mathematician – I thought 
it was vice versa! 
All of my informants have tended to express variations of this conviction that behavioural 
economics offers more important insights into human behaviour than economics in general, as 
well as stress the belief that economics research generates more practical knowledge than other 
forms of social science research. The fact that most of my informants have received training in 
scientific disciplines other than economics is in line with Hylmö’s (2017, p. 20) assertion that the 
contrarian impulses of heterodox economists often have their “roots in formal or informal training 
or studies in areas closer to other social sciences”. It would appear that early exposure to a variety 
of different styles of reasoning during the course of academic training impacts the specific 
scientific habitus of agents, guiding them towards interdisciplinary subfields that may be 
considered unorthodox or dissenting by the rest of the members of their field. The fact that my 
informants have, however, expressed confidence in both the importance of behavioural economics 
and the practicality of general economic knowledge arguably shows that they possess a 
fundamental belief in the stakes – i.e. illusio – of both the field of academic economics and the 
behavioural economics subfield. This illusio correlates with their position within the mainstream 
core of academic economics. 
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Though I have stated that the responses from the behavioural economists seem to confirm 
the image of the economics discipline sketched in my introduction, and although they exhibit a 
belief in the doxa and nomos of academic economics, my informants have at times demonstrated a 
rather critical attitude towards the scientific production of their discipline. The professors I have 
interviewed have, in particular, displayed a high level of self-reflexivity regarding the nature of 
behavioural economics research. When discussing the methodology and findings of behavioural 
economists, one professor exemplified a piece of self-critique like this: 
I: A huge problem with laboratory experiments in behavioural economics is the fact that so 
many studies cannot be replicated, that there are different results as soon as the next person 
comes along and does the same thing. This confirms that we are not really having very 
robust findings – and the findings that are robust tend to be so general and broad that they 
are almost part of what your grandmother could tell you as a proverb about how people 
behave.  
This professor went on to describe many findings from behavioural economics research as 
“unsurprising” and “pretty baseline” insights into human behaviour, while a different professor 
went even further and suggested that behavioural economists “reinvented the wheel, in a sense”. 
Though generally displaying a very favourable attitude towards mathematical methods, my 
informants also expressed some disapproval towards economists who take these tools too far; one 
of the PhD students noted that “you can prove something very obvious in a very, very, very 
tedious way with math”. 
Utilizing Bourdieu’s thinking tools and the concept of styles of thinking arguably offers 
multifaceted ways of understanding the internal dynamics of the field of academic economics. 
Their training in different styles of thinking seems to be a factor that influences behavioural 
economists towards their subfield, though they also seem to maintain an illusio that heterodox 
economists would presumably not display. The dual positions my informants have taken when 
discussing their disciplinary subfield also seems to originate in their pluralistic training. As I have, 
for instance, not interviewed any neoclassical economists, this study is, however, not in a position 
to say that behavioural economists are trained in other disciplines more frequently than other 
economists, nor that they are more reflexive and critical about their scientific production than their 
mainstream colleagues. 
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 Thoughts on Interdisciplinary Research 4.3
One unanticipated theme that arose from my informants’ responses to the open-ended questions in 
my interview guide (see Appendix) was their articulation of opinions regarding the nature of 
interdisciplinary dynamics. When I asked them to agree or disagree with the statement “In general, 
interdisciplinary knowledge is better than knowledge obtained by a single discipline” (in line with 
Table 3), all of the behavioural economists I have spoken to agreed. Though the question “Have 
you ever conducted research together with academics from other disciplines?” was primarily 
formulated to further allow the behavioural economists to express their attitudes towards other 
scientific fields, the interview-responses often took the form of long musings regarding potential 
knowledge-exchange. While the responses to the questions regarding other disciplines were often 
where my informants talked about the methodological differences between economics and the 
other social sciences, they also deliberated on how different social science disciplines often have 
“different names for the same things” and “offer different perspectives” on human behaviour. The 
response of one professor is exemplary for this kind of dual position-taking: 
WH: And then, what are your opinions of the other social sciences? We've touched upon the 
other social sciences; we've touched a bit on this… 
I: Well, I think that one should be… I mean I must be somewhat careful, because I should 
read much more about… I read now and then some sociology, I read some literature in 
management, I read some psychology… What I think is – I mean, I think that economics is a 
little bit ahead when it comes to quantitative testing and quantitative reasoning, and treating 
data. That I think. But I also think that economics, compared to some other sciences, is a 
little bit… lags behind when it comes to systematic theoretically generated methods based on 
induction. 
WH: Oh, okay. 
I: We don't really have this. So, for instance, when you an interview, an in-depth interview 
and so on, these are techniques to quickly – as I see it – to quickly learn something about, 
perhaps, a new phenomenon. I mean we, with our statistical tools, we cannot measure new 
phenomena because the data is not there. And then I think these methods in other social 
sciences are more, more suitable – better. But I think that another feature would be that we, 
in economics, are about more about testing things, like classical positivists, while other 
social scientists are more descriptive in manner. For instance, psychologists, a lot of their 
papers are about describing things. And they are quite happy with just describing things, but 
we would like to test things. 
It appears that, although immersed in the mathematical, statistical, and causal styles of reasoning 
characteristic of the economics field, behavioural economists perhaps have a larger appreciation 
for the styles of the other social sciences than mainstream economists generally have. The 
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likelihood of this appreciation could perhaps have been foreseen due to the behavioural economics 
subfield’s historical connection with, in particular, the psychology discipline. One aspect of my 
data that is, however, particularly enlightening is the difference in the attitudes of the PhD students 
in comparison to the professors. Though they shared the same general appreciation of the other 
social sciences with the professors, the PhD students were somewhat anxious towards 
interdisciplinary research, as they for instance believed that “you can go further in your own 
discipline” due to not having to make compromises. The professors, who had all, unlike the PhD 
students, actually conducted research with academics from other fields, displayed a much more 
positive stance towards the compatibility of different disciplines. The professors specifically noted 
that they felt very favourably disposed towards knowledge exchange between behavioural 
economists and researchers in neuropsychology and economic sociology. Regarding the latter 
subject, one professor specified that they felt more compatible with researchers from the US, as 
“they are more quantitative than European researchers”. 
My theoretical framework again offers interesting ways of describing the results of my 
study. The way the behavioural economists remain favourably inclined towards other sciences 
while maintaining a belief in the doxa and nomos of academic economics is in line with their 
scientific habitus as well as their position within their field. Just as behavioural economists tend to 
have received training in different styles of reasoning, economists who have conducted 
interdisciplinary research seem to be more positively inclined towards these types of endeavours. 
This suggests that the dispositions of the specific scientific habitus require practical experience in 
order to shift. Though the behavioural economists I have spoken to may be of the opinion that 
qualitative styles of reasoning are sometimes more suitable, they prefer to utilize the quantitative 
tools of their discipline. The fact that some of the professors expressed a compatibility with 
quantitative economic sociologists in the US suggests that styles of reasoning are not necessarily 
limited to a specific scientific discipline. Rather, styles of reasoning can act as bridges between 
separate scientific fields. 
 
 Concluding Remarks 5
Grown out of an aspiration to provide analytical tools for the study of the economics discipline, 
this thesis has at least succeeded in its attempt to fill a particular place in the sociology of 
economics. My in-depth interview study has, in collaboration with my presentation of previous 
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literature on the subject, provided my analysis with ample data on which to utilize the theoretical 
framework that I set out to evaluate. Below, I offer some concluding remarks concerning my study 
and make an attempt to provide answers to my research questions. 
With regards to my first research question – “How do behavioural economists at Swedish 
universities view the advancement of their subfield in the economics discipline?” – I believe that I 
have provided ample contextualization and some new insights into the rise of behavioural 
economics. Though my interview study focused on professors and PhD students at the economics 
departments at Lund University and the Stockholm School of Economics, I believe that the data 
gathered from this small sample of behavioural economists is likely to be relevant to other 
settings, since my data is by and large in agreement with several other studies. Behavioural 
economists at Swedish universities, then, understand academic economics to be defined by its 
methods, which are quantitative, and its aspirations, which largely concern pinning down 
causalities. The behavioural economists recognizes their subfield to be positioned within the 
mainstream of economics, and they display an understanding of the way in which the subfield has 
gained ground that is in line with historical accounts of the process. It seems that behavioural 
economics has superseded the insularity of the economics discipline by utilizing the possibilities 
of causal inferences enabled by the experimental method in order to provide proof of the validity 
of its theories. 
Concerning my second research question – “How can a theoretical approach informed by the 
social theory of Pierre Bourdieu and the concept of styles of reasoning add to the understanding of 
disciplinary dynamics in academic economics?” – my results are also quite promising. Bourdieu’s 
thinking tools have in my analysis allowed me to comprehensively describe many disciplinary 
phenomena that I have found evidence of in my study. Though I have utilized much of Bourdieu’s 
theory, I believe that his sociology of science could be used much more exhaustively to great 
effect in the study of disciplinary dynamics. An understanding of doxa, nomos, and the scientific 
habitus especially assist with the analysis of how the social process of scientific production 
functions. The styles of reasoning approach offers a simplified way of discussing many 
disciplinary phenomena, making it possible to outline several important aspects of the sociology 
of the economics discipline.  
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 Appendix: Interview Guide 7
THEME QUESTIONS 
 
Background 
 
• How did you become interested in economics? 
• What did your academic training look like? 
• How did you become interested in behavioural economics, 
specifically? 
 
Scientific Production and 
the Economics Discipline 
 
• What is important in science? 
• What separates good science from bad science? 
• What are your opinions of the other social sciences? 
• What particularly sets economics apart from the other social 
sciences? 
• Have you ever conducted research together with academics 
from other disciplines? 
 
The Mainstream–
Heterodox Divide and the 
2008 Financial Crisis 
 
• What is your perspective on the “mainstream–heterodoxy”-
debate in economics? 
• Has the debate intensified since the 2008 financial crisis? 
• Has the debate influenced your view of economics? 
• Was the failure to predict the crisis indicative of a failure of 
academic economics? 
• Is behavioural economics better equipped to explain 
economic crises? 
 
The Rise of Behavioural 
Economics 
 
• Why do you think behavioural economics has gained such 
renown in recent years? 
• What is the most important aspect that behavioural 
economics adds to economics? 
• What major barriers do you think behavioural economics 
has had to face in gaining ground within economics? 
• Is the rise of behavioural economics indicative of a larger 
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shift within economics? 
• What is your view on behavioural economists winning the 
Nobel Prize? 
• Would you consider behavioural economics “mainstream”? 
• Why has behavioural economics succeeded in gaining 
ground when other dissenting theories are still considered 
“heterodox”? 
 
The Experimental Method 
 
• What are your thoughts on the difference between 
experimental methods and other forms of empirical data? 
• Why has economics only fairly recently turned to 
experiments? 
• What is the difference between economic experiments and 
psychological experiments? 
• What sets the experimental method apart from other 
methodologies excluded from economics? 
• What are your opinions on the mathematical nature of 
economics? 
• Which is more important, theory or methodology? Why? 
• Statement: “In general, interdisciplinary knowledge is better 
than knowledge obtained by a single discipline”. Agree or 
disagree? 
 
Conclusion 
 
• Do you have any questions? 
• Do you want to make any concluding remarks? 
 
